Archive for the ‘Europe as a social space’ Category

Utopia remains close, but far, after the Dahrendorf Symposium

Written by Tobias Sauer | November 16, 2011 | 0 Comments | Theme: A future for Europe?, Dahrendorf Symposium, Europe as a political economy, Europe as a social space

Eleven panels, roundtables and keynote speeches brought together 53 participants (though the real number is actually slightly lower, as some speakers appeared more than once on the podium) from politics, academia and civil society. The Dahrendorf Symposium, held last week at the Berlin-Brandenburgische Akademie der Wissenschaften in Berlin, pointed high and aimed at “Changing the Debate on Europe”.

In fact, participants discussed European democracy, the European social space and the European foreign policy. The dominant topic, however, was the euro-crisis. As Alina Mungiu-Pippidi from Hertie School has pointed out, three alternative ways to handle the crisis became apparent. The first one she labeled “Transformative Power of Europe reloaded”. It is basically a more-of-the-same-strategy, whose proponents suggest that after the crisis, European countries, cultures and economies will re-converge towards a more united Europe. The second option, called by her “Abandon the Bridge Too Far”, presumes that not all European countries can really cope with a common currency. A break-up of the euro would be the consequence. In that case, alternatives have to be found to make possible a smooth transition and the continuing existence of a European project – though it won’t be the same as today’s project. The third way would be a further differentiation of the integration process.

None of these three options found consensus, of course. Experts and policy-makers alike are unsure how the crisis will evolve and what measures are adequate to address it. All options would have consequences for citizens, but which exactly remains somewhat obscure.

Are these options new? Did the Dahrendorf Symposium succeed in “Changing the Debate on Europe”? No. All of them were discussed in newspapers and think tanks for some time now. But the Dahrendorf Symposium was nevertheless an opportunity to meet and discuss the current crisis, as it brought together so many participants, including ministers, ex- and incoming-Prime Ministers, and Parliamentarians from different countries.

What was missing in the debate? As the euro-crisis consumes much of the time, other issues never made it on the table. Discussions of resource-consumption and environment are victims of the euro-crisis, the situation of migrants and minorities was discussed only at the margins and possible negative consequences of the currency-crisis for democracy in Europe are acknowledged while alternatives were unfortunately not suggested.

Public participation has always been a weak point in European integration. To allow for more participation would mean a real major shift in the debate on Europe. But as long as discussions about the right way forward in Europe are seen as essentially negative, as long as publics in European states don’t take notice of arguments in other countries and don’t engage in public discussions with them, as long as the media are seeing developments in Europe often enough as “foreign” news, even if these developments affect very directly welfare and well-being of the citizens, as long as the media entrench themselves behind barriers of national borderlines, such a change of debate still seems to be a kind of utopia. Many more forums, and not only, are still needed to turn this so close utopia to reality.

Is Europe forgetting its social problems with regard to minorities?

Written by Tobias Sauer | November 15, 2011 | 0 Comments | Theme: Conflict in Europe, Europe as a social space

Is a cold wind blowing in Europe, when it comes to its minorities? Participants agreed at last week’s panel on “Europe as a social space” at the Dahrendorf Symposium in Berlin: “We witness a decline of social space in Europe”, said Hakan Seckinelgin from the London School of Economics. “Europe has become a closed society, there is a racialization of society”, added Eric Fassin from the École Normale Supérieure in Paris. “The scapegoat is changing but the logic of exclusion is the same”, said Angela Kocze from the European Roma Rights Center, a lobby group, in Budapest and the Central European University.

And indeed, Mrs. Kocze gave some depressing figures: More than 90 percent of Hungary’s Roma are unemployed. Very low numbers of Roma go to high school. A mere 0.2 percent of Roma attend university, she said. “We are witnessing the gradual empowerment of the extreme right in Hungary, the Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden”, Mrs. Kocze added. But not only on the political right has the climate got chilly: “Italian authorities expelled European (Roma) citizens. And this decision was not taken by far-right politicians, but by the center-left government led by Romano Prodi”, she bemoaned.

Her conclusion was obvious: “The European project is under threat: From the left, from the far right”, and “from neoliberalism”.

Missing in this discussion were possible solutions to address the issue. Instead, participants largely stopped at concentrating on the problem. However, it became clear again, that missing information is a key. European media coverage on transnational social problems is far too superficial and random. When did you hear the last time about Roma exclusion in the (German) press? What do you know about Roma living in Berlin? When did you read the last interview with migrants coming to live here disclosing their motivations? Media and public, it seems, first have to recognize migrants and minorities, before stereotypes can pass to give way to more profound knowledge.

Fassin on a New Racialization of Europe

Written by Vera Guenther | November 10, 2011 | 0 Comments | Theme: A future for Europe?, Dahrendorf Symposium, Europe as a social space

The Symposium started with a panel on ‘Europe as a Social space’. Eric Fassin, Professor of Sociology at the École Normale Supérieure (ENS), Paris, spoke about the shift of a former open access European social order towards a closed and racialist one. Contrary to Dahrendorf’s understanding of Europe as ‘a closed system to create a open society’ in 1989, in Fassin’s eyes Europe today is incrementally racialised. Proclamations about the ‘failure of multiculturalism’ create the picture that Europe’s tolerance is the core problem but not the rising intolerance. Fassin sees the year 1989 as a turning point because diminishing class conflicts gave way to address social issues in a racial way.

In 2005 the rejection of the European Constitutional Treaty led to a search for its failure in cultural aspects in order to preserve the EU, its integrity and national identities.

Is Europe going backwards?

The crucial difference between racism in the early 20th century and xenophobia today is that in the past racism was automatically connected with anti-democratic forces. Today racism is justified in the name of democracy: Geert Wilders, a right-wing politician from the Netherlands claims that he is not extreme right-wing because he has nothing against homosexuality movements nor against women rights but instead wants to defend them against Islamic forces that want to destroy these achievements. In 2007 Sarkozy stated that ‘in France women are free’.

A tendency labelled as ‘sexual nationalism’ sheds light on a new form of racialization of Europe: Gender and sexuality help to maintain the definitions of ‘us’ and ‘them’ and serve to justify in democratic terms the rejection of others.

The core problem here is that ideals are connected with identities and values are seen identity-dependent. If we are able to overcome that issue, it would lead to a joint effort in promoting these liberal ideas.

Helmut K. Anheier on the creation of a European social space

Written by Johannes Erhard | November 10, 2011 | 0 Comments | Theme: Europe as a social space

How to create a European social space?

Helmut K. Anheier, the dean of the Hertie School, looked back at European societies in the 1950s when the legacy of violent conflict still lingered on and one of the greatest challenges for the founding fathers of the European Union was to appease the citizens and generate a civil European society by building up understanding, trust and acceptance of each other as equal.

This social engeneering endeavour was stated by a series of smaller programmes rather than by a master plan, but under the one premise: only when there were more opportunities for European encounters of citizens across borders, the cultural obstacles of the past could be overcome and the gradual building up of an European identity could be enabled. Thus, numerous initiatives of towns and citizens to get together were started and (foreign) language education in schools was increased.

If we look back now and judge whether the attempt in social engineering has worked, the answer is partly yes, but there are some interesting patterns to be observed:

While there is a certain limited level in European society we could call “the Europeans” and is dominated by confident, well-educated and well networked professionals, cutting across countries, there is also a large share of citizens that is less educated or from the “new precariat”, holds blue-collar jobs, hardly travels and has little international contacts. The latter group tends to identify least with Europe and tends to abstain from European elections or vote against Europe. This euro-scepticism is strongest among male, little educated blue-collar workers.

Having this simple, but disturbing observation in mind, Anheier in his conference paper sheds light on the challenge of bringing European citizens together (especially those from a less educated background) and looks at the current status of several European initiatives to bring European citizens together:

Looking at town twinning programmes he finds that the number of town twinnings has stagnated. Looking at the ERASMUS exchange programme, he finds that while currently 200.000 students participate in the exchange programme per year, students from lower education backgrounds are not only significantly less likely to go to university but also significantly less likely to participate in the ERASMUS exchange. There is hence a double disadvantage. Also vocational exchange programmes, were you would probably expect less of a class bias show similar patterns with people from less educated backgrounds being less likely to take part in exchange programmes.

The various mechanisms for creating and consolidating Europe’s social space seem less relevant today than in the 1950-70s because they are either less attractive to upcoming generations, are taken for granted , limited with regards to the kind of population groups they factually address, or tend to “preach to the converted”. The programmes failed, and continue to fail, to reach the less educated, blue-collar workers and the lower-middle class as well as the “new precariat”.

His conclusion from that is that social engineering in the context of constructing a European society has to be rethought and modified. For example, town winnings between two disadvantaged neighbourhoods (like the one of Berlin Neukölln and Paris Boulogne-Billancourt) rather than between towns and cities as a whole can overcome the social class bias quite successfully. Providing incentives for students from less well-off backgrounds to participate in exchange programmes at school or university is a second important point. Also the role of new social media, especially in following up town twinning exchanges can play a crucial role of establishing contact between citizens across European countries. Anheier also underlines that exchange between European citizens does not always need to be initiated by governments or the European Union: Also the corporate world and civil society actors could contribute with their own initiatives to get people across Europe together and re-energize the creation of a European social space.



The grand past, the fragile present and the undefined future of Europe

Written by Marta Kozlowska | November 9, 2011 | 0 Comments | Theme: A future for Europe?, Dahrendorf Symposium, Europe as a political economy, Europe as a social space, Europe in crisis, European identity, Global Europe
The opening of the Dahrendorf Symposium, with a small recital given by a Chinese pianist playing Ode to Joy is nothing but a very strong example of how global the world has become. The young musician, educated in Europe and living here, can be perceived as a member of the European demos, without actually being part of any actual European nation. Whether he feels European or not, he is a part of the society. Regardless of the efforts of some to make Europe a ‘fortress Europe’, it is not cut off from the rest of the world and would rather never be.
Truly, it it not possible to speak about Europe without taking into account the bigger, global picture. It is not only an oversimplification but also an unforgivable negligence of the events shaping Europe today. It is also ignorance of the backlash of the European deeds and acts influencing and shaping the world before it lost its dependence to the Old Continent. The interplay between the old and new directions of influence is an interesting switch for Europe, as for centuries it has europeanized the whole globe and today is more and more entangled in the different forces in the world it ones owned.
The role and global impact of Europe today is far from being clear. The former centre of the world, the military, cultural and political superior, today is more like an old lady with fine manners and old values, who spends days on ambitious readings, balls and social gatherings, but do not put herself in the turmoil of the global events. For years already Europe is a reactionary entity. Europe reacts on the events in the world, but do not claim to have power and ambition to actually initiate anything. Too focused on the internal tensions and interests, Europe is not taking the lead in the world. On the other hand, it is hard to imagine a leader with so many heads. Too many cooks spoils the broth.

In order to understand the place of Europe in today’s world we have to understand the role and importance of Europe in the previous centuries as well as the events that brought about the fall of the world order imposed by the European nations and the European thought. The rapid and unexpected downfall of the Old World was not thinkable even at the beginning of the 20th century, yet it managed to deprive the region all its former power just within a few decades.

The collapse of Europe in the 20th century is marked by three events: the First World War, the so-called ‘civil war of Europe’, which brought the military and economic superiority of the Old Continent to an end. Then, the Second World War, staining the European nations with the moral guilt oppression and genocide. The extermination of European Jews not only deprived the continent one of its vital element, for years building the tissue of almost every European society, but also caused a decline of its global meaning.

Within one generation the most important region of the world ended up completely without significance, facing the loss of their colonies that indeed followed, and with its new power centres placed both outside the continent – one in Washington, the other in Moscow. In aftermath the European powers, such as Great Britain, France and Germany have lost their traditional legitimacy to impose their will over the world. The remains of the former power were reflected in the structure of the UN Security Council, but it was a mere a consolation prize. But the picture was straightforward: the power was gone. It was gone so far that the states in the continent were also deprived the possibility to rule their own territory as a sovereign.

On the other hand, the tragedy of European downfall, the forsaken of the Central Europe to the Soviet bloc for the price of peace, the acceptance of the darker spill-offs of the European dominance turned out to have one positive consequence: it enabled the European integration as we know it today. The cooperation between the Western countries was the only possibility for them to be a more or less equal partner to the United States of America, the de facto winner of the war, along the Soviet Union.

It was also the only way for the former important global actors France, Germany and Italy to come back to the game. France was ridiculed by its shameful defeat and exposed weakness. Italy was not treated seriously as the initiator of the fascist movements and governments and later as a military partner of limited skills and abilities. Finally, Germany – compromised by its responsibility of the war and the Holocaust, humiliated by losing much of its territory in the West and divided into two countries locked on the opposite sides of the Iron Curtain. Starting the cooperation within the European Communities was the only chance for them to regain their meaning.

Today we tend to forget that the construction of the European cooperation was not only about security and peace, but also about dignity and self-respect. In a way, the European project was a bit Utopian wish to prove the existence of the positive, valuable and good part of the European heritage. The possibility to be actually proud of Europe, which sounds pretty natural today, must be a great step towards what the grounding fathers were dreaming about.

Back to Dahrendorf Symposium and the moving music played by Xiao Xiao Zhu, symbolically bringing Europe to the conference room and the conference room to Europe, we stand at the beginning of a two-day conference focusing on the strenghts, threats and opportunities, both internal and global, that Europe is facing today.

The many burning questions and problems that European Union is facing today cannot be answered just within these two days. But aksing the questions and pinning-up the problems and then discussing them is a small input the event can bring to the bigger debate on the present and future of Europe.

The present crisis underlys the political weakness of the European Union and demands financial and political solutions for now and here. But the project is not yet complete. Even if we are now busy with plugging the holes in the ship named Europe, we must not forget to decide in which direction the ship should actually go. Without defining our goals and values, without defining where we want to be fifty years from now, we cannot count on the rest of the world to be inspired and our own citizens to be excited.

Damian Chalmers: The Birth of European Tragedy

Written by Damian Chalmers | November 8, 2011 | 0 Comments | Theme: A future for Europe?, Damian Chalmers, Europe as a political economy, Europe as a social space, Europe in crisis, European identity, Global Europe

How to approach the eve of the Dahrendorf Symposium when events of such moment are swirling all around it? There is certainly an irony in their being such a stark expression of his hopes and concerns for European integration.

If Dahrendorf advocated that borders should not obstruct the addressing of common problems then, barely noticed, something momentous has taken place. The battle is still ongoing but maybe, finally, a political entity has emerged with sufficient firepower to counter run-away financial capitalism. The spreads may have widened, but despite all the hysteria, the combined fire-power of the European Financial Stability Facility and ECB purchase of assets through the Securities Market Programme has countered financial speculative runs on a country’s economy.

He would also possibly have noted that his predictions of an à la carte European Union are being realised and in very dramatic ways! If it is fashionable to assume that countries using the euro will form part of a fiscal union with a very different political and legal settlement from others, there is a certain anorak-ish satisfaction in thinking about the different permutations.

There are the seventeen euro area States within the Union; States using the euro not within the Union; States within the Union who cannot conceive of using the euro; States within the Union committed to join the euro in the next years who are hesitating, and other States who are not.

Furthermore, if a Union State is outside this fiscal union does it have more in common with euro area States or with non- EU States with links to the Union? It is not clear in a few years time, irrespective of any future opt-outs, whether the legal obligations of the United Kingdom might not be more analogous to those of Norway than to those of France. It is an open question about whether that means more rethinking how the United Kingdom is identified with the Union or how Norway is identified with it.

However, recent events have grimly vindicated Dahrendorf’s concerns about the creation of a system with such a thin common identification between its citizens in which national representative institutions have been so strongly displaced and where agenda-setting is so dominated by supranational or transnational bureaus. Trust has corroded in public institutions during the crisis. Parliaments have been railroaded. Europe’s public sphere has given rise some of the most venomous and mutually belittling discourse during the crisis

Simply to dwell on this is to provide no more than a rhapsody of regret. Equally to promise institutional reforms with lots of jam tomorrow for national parliaments and civil society within the Union settlement is to play at the philosopher-king. It is also to make very problematic assumptions about their willingness to engage with such a project and their operative capacities within it, in particular their ability to mobilise their central constituencies to follow them.

Perhaps a new starting point for the Union is to centre itself less about recreating reality and more about reflecting upon the realities within which it must work.

In this, the epithet of the Greek tragedy, deployed as a cliché and a leitmotiv during the crisis, may have a powerful German twist. Few have made it as resonant for modern times as Friedrich Nietzsche.

His Birth of Tragedy argued that the Greek Tragedy brought together two traditions of belief: the Apollonian belief in illusion and the Dionysian in intoxication. The Apollonian illusion was the belief in the capacity to prophesy truth and in the possibility for an individual to perfect herself through reason. Illusion made life possible and bearing but it was, according to Nietzsche, highly individualising. Intoxication expressed, by contrast, our primal condition. It was the ineradicable and powerful presence and lust for pain and pleasure, which, if chaotic and destabilising, also brought humans together in its commonality.

The Greek Tragedy reminded its audience of the exceptionalism to reason in all human life; that reason had, therefore, many illusionary qualities; and that life was painful and limited. It did so moreover, Nietzsche noted, in vital and empirical ways. If the shared painful exposure to this brought the audience together, the Tragedy also had healing qualities. It created constructs, most notably the Sublime and the Comic, which made the painfulness of this more bearable.

So what lessons does this ancient institution hold for the modern crisis?

A feature of the crisis has been many narratives of suffering. There is the Greek and other debtor State suffering; the scapegoating of them as the new deserving European poor; money destined to alleviate the suffering of the sick, the old and the poor in Germany and other creditor States now signposted for other things; Central and East European States having to bankroll wealthier States the suffering of the truly marginalised whose representation is lost in world categorised into rich and poor States.

All these narratives are real, justified and, like the Greek Tragedy, have brought people together. But they are insulated from one another. Few of their exponents express little appreciation of the suffering and challenges of others. Instead, the alleviation of the suffering of others is simultaneously seen as a cause for one’s own suffering and therefore not an authentic issue of concern in its own right.

The Greek Tragedy might tell us therefore three things.

First, although solutions to the crisis must be sought there is no magic bullet. Results will be partial and responses ad hoc and contradictory. Almost certainly the genesis of the next crisis will be found in the ‘resolution’ of this one. Any careful reading of the European Economic Governance package, for example, suggests it is full of risks and tensions. This does not prevent this quest being worthless as the counterfactual might be something much worse. States without government are invariably worse than states of imperfect government.

Secondly, would it be beyond Europe’s leaders to show some common sense of the suffering and challenges taking place? Would it hurt for Merkel to visit places in Athens or other Greek cities which help the victims of the crisis? Or Papandreou to visit Slovakia to listen and experience the challenges confronting that State or to express greater acknowledgement of the needs of the German poor? Such acts might help change the wider terms of the debate. It would certainly be more uplifting if newspapers in different States focussed on the inspiring and multiple attempts in all European societies to overcome difficulty rather than lapsing into dehumanising stereotypes. Civil society might respond to its nobler traditions of ‘help thy neighbour’ in a manner not notable in any strong transnational sense during the crisis.

Thirdly, there needs to be a reassertion of the sublime in European lives. This can certainly not be done through some ghastly political or legal appropriation by Europe’s leaders – be it through some Action Plan or common statement. However, if the European Union were swept away in some popular revolution, there would still probably be a desire to retain the sport, music, cinema, art exhibitions, travel, religion or study that we associate and experience as coming from other parts of Europe, doing in other parts of Europe or doing with other European. It weakens and does not capture the heterogeneity of these experiences to identify them as ‘cultural’, ‘youth’ or ‘educational’ activities as the rubric of the Treaty on European Union does. Instead, their value lies in their taking us beyond ourselves and experiencing or doing something different that would not be possible alone. If many seem part of the local fabric of daily lives or seem universal rather than ‘European’. However, it is also true that many have a European genesis, and they all depend much on the activities of other Europeans. The development and worth of the European idea depends much upon its power to recreate and reinvent these forms of activity, experience and interaction. It is, of course, unknowable whether this will happen.

 

Valentina Zigante: The (in)equitability of choice and competition policies in public services

Written by Valentina Zigante | November 8, 2011 | 0 Comments | Theme: Europe as a social space, Valentina Zigante

Whether or not we are living in the end times, it is clear that now more than ever the very core of our economic system is being questioned. The global protest movement, fast gaining momentum in Europe following the Euro-crisis, is putting neo-liberal ideals and the dynamics and incentives of capitalism as an economic system at the centre of their critique, claiming, among other things that the system produces inequalities and unfair societies. Also, in the face of the global economic downturn and the prolonged negative effects of the Euro-crisis, it is clear that the already stretched welfare states of European countries will face increasing challenges. In light of this, now is an opportune moment to consider the advance of the European welfare state (if there is such a thing), which has increasingly become aligned with the ideals of neo-liberal economics. Do the issues raised in the protests also apply to the more regulated variety of competition prevalent in many European welfare states?

The role of the EU in this is questionable; while some consider it decisive under a “European consumer choice agenda” others consider the impact of the EU to be modest at best. In any case, market incentives, through individual choice and reimbursement systems inducing competition between providers, are thought to bring efficiency and increased quality to public services as diverse as health, education and employment services – all of which fits neatly with the EU’s promotion of free competition. For some, particularly in the UK, choice and competition is seen as promoting equity since the policies offer choice to everyone, rather than just wealthy individuals capable of operating in the private sector.

Increasingly, interest among academics has centred on the evaluation of the effects of choice policies, mainly in the UK, but also across Europe. There is some evidence for efficiency and quality improvements but hardly any (at least reliable) for equity effects. At issue here is the imperfect information available in many public services – something that has particularly strong implications for equity. It is well established that access to information and the capacity to process it is better among more educated individuals. Compared to other social groups, the well-educated tend to be high-income earners, more capable of “gaming the system” and better at gaining access to the services they desire. Yet surveys suggest that lower social groups actually demand more choice than do higher ones. The implications for the equity of welfare provision are unclear, and in the end we need to question whether a market solution is likely to lead to an equitable outcome, or whether certain groups are likely to monopolise the benefits.

On the other hand, there is a key difference between private markets and competition in public services: the level of regulation and political accountability. It is clear that the structure of the financial system incentivises behaviour has ramifications for the global economy, and many argue that lack of regulation is to blame. Still, at the centre of this argument is the question of whether something that enters into an imperfect system, without a primary objective to be equitable, can create the correct incentives for an allocation that will result in an equitable outcome. This, the protest movement argues, is the key problem with the capitalist economic system. So, with this in mind, might we want to apply the same logic to the reform of European welfare states? If the incentives of the market provide a poor structure for the development of fair societies, should we believe they will do the trick for public services?

 

 

Daniel Sarmiento: It’s time to tell a story

Written by Daniel Sarmiento | November 4, 2011 | 2 Comments | Theme: Daniel Sarmiento, Europe as a political economy, Europe as a social space, Europe in crisis, European identity

The current crisis that affects the EU is indeed one of political leadership. It is economic too, for many of its causes are linked to the euro-zone’s stagnant growth, high unemployment rates in some Member States and rogue fiscal policies in others. We could even argue that it is a crisis of values, of lost faith in party politics and in liberal democracies as they have been understood and put into practice in the past decades. However, these are just partial explanations to the present existential crisis, for it is exactly that: it is existential, it is about identity, and it is about the EU’s role and purpose.

The current political and economic ills are part of a deeper malaise. After all, the British do not question the use of the United Kingdom as a political organisation simply because their economy endures difficulties and its politicians loose credibility before their citizens. The Italians do not want to put an end to the Italian State because of Berlusconi, they only want to get rid of Berlusconi. Then why are Europeans questioning once again the purpose and the very future of the EU during the present times? Why can’t we achieve a constructive debate about economic governance, redistribution or social welfare, instead of reopening over and over again the debate about the EU’s future?

Europe is lacking a common story, a common narrative about its origins, its outcome and its telos. In contrast to many States, including its Member States, the EU is still missing a convincing account of its own past and present that binds its citizens towards the future. To date, the narrative of European integration is one of technocratic engineering orchestrated by national and EU elites, driven by the legitimate goal of avoiding war between the nations of Europe through the means of an internal market. But fascinating and noble as this may seem, the ghost of war and the internal market are simply not enough anymore. It is time to explain why the EU is much more than a peace-driven project, and it is time for politicians to face their citizens to address some difficult issues.

It is time to tell Europe’s citizens that the Union’s Member States, including its big States, have become irrelevant players in the world scene, transformed into a caricature of their glorious and imperial past. It is also time to tell Europe’s citizens that the EU is not a State and that it will never become one. The EU was created precisely to put an end to the ills and wrongs of Europe’s nation States, and the future of the Union depends on the very existence of its Member States and not their dissolution like sugar cubes in a glass of water. It is also time to explain why Europe needs fiscal redistribution in order to assure prosperity and growth throughout its territory. It is time to realise that Europe must assume the responsibility of its own defence through a common structure that puts effectively into action its Member State’s resources. And it is time to decide, once and for all, where does Europe end and where does it begin. If the Union is soon to enlarge beyond its current frontiers, citizens must know that Europe will undergo profound transformations. Citizens must know that, and our politicians must face the challenge.

 

Alexander Kleibrink: Bringing citizens back in – Is more tax justice and transparency an answer to Europe’s problems?

Written by Alexander Kleibrink | November 3, 2011 | 0 Comments | Theme: Conflict in Europe, Europe as a political economy, Europe as a social space, Europe in crisis

We all have the feeling that the EU is distancing itself more and more from its citizens. Not only the recent spread of the ‘occupy’ movement to EU countries reflects this, but also prior demonstrations in Athens, Madrid, Reykjavik and other cities highlight the disenchantment citizens feel. This is not only due to the actual policies adopted by Europe’s leading politicians that follow the markets rather than public opinion. It is at the same time about a more general and profound feeling of insecurity and disempowerment of citizens. How can citizens regain the feeling of ownership over the democratic process which seems now so far out of sight? In the same vein, how can governments regain the trust of their citizens?

 

To me both questions are central for reaching a sustainable solution for the European crisis. Rather than only tackling the current symptoms of fiscal deficits, we need a much more comprehensive package of policy measures. But what should such a package include? In my view, we finally have to start talking more about the big elephant in the room. And act accordingly. Two issues will be crucial for avoiding a return of this kind of crisis and to get the citizens on board. First, governments have to show credible commitment to tax justice, both internationally and at home. Second, European governments should not only preach transparency to developing countries, but they should also get their own house in order.

 

First some words on tax justice. Justice is a big word, and it means that governments should apply the same and democratically decided criteria to all members of society with the same status (citizens as well as companies) while also considering their financial ability to pay taxes. But now we are still in a situation in which losses are socialised whereas gains are privatised. Even the recent agreement on the debt restructuring for Greece with the participation of private banks does not change the overall problem. How can we allow that employees cannot escape paying income taxes, but wealthy individuals and firms can do this much easier? The current discussion on capital flight from Greece is only one example. Broadening the tax base and making taxation more just should be the prime objective of any government. It increases tax revenue and opens up the scope for government action. More importantly, it shows the citizens that all members of society have to contribute to public goods and social welfare. Yet, making taxation just has also an increasingly international dimension to it. Estimates say that up to 9 trillion US$ are held in off-shore deposits. Ever increasing international financial flows – both legal and illicit – and the possibility to hide money in tax havens make it difficult to trace money and enforce taxation. At the beginning of the first crisis in 2008, the public outcry was loud and politicians promised to prohibit certain speculative financial products and to close down such tax havens. But what has happened? Not too much. According to the Financial Secrecy Index published by the Tax Justice Network, eight EU member states have remained among the world’s most secretive jurisdictions in the past two years concerning their tax policy, and their reluctance to share information and comply with international norms. These are Luxembourg, UK (and several island territories), Ireland, Belgium, Austria, Portugal (Madeira), Netherlands and Latvia. It is interesting to note that most of these countries are from the EU’s ‘north’. If governments allow these secretive practices to continue, citizens will hardly get the feeling that justice prevails.

Finally some words on transparency and government. I believe transparency has two inter-related aims: to inform citizens in a simple way on the spending of tax payer money, and to provide a monitoring mechanism that helps curtail corruption. Concerning both aspects, there is much we still have to do in EU member states. In the news, we regularly hear about corrupt practices in Pakistan, Nigeria and other distant developing countries. But we do not have to travel so far. The European Commission believes that corruption costs the EU economy 120 billion EUR annually. So we are not only talking about Greek fakelaki, we are talking about a much more systemic problem that is associated with the fiscal deficits we are dealing with right now. That is why the EU will install a monitoring mechanism for assessing the anti-corruption efforts of member states. This is a big step in the right direction. But more importantly, governments should themselves embrace more innovative transparency regulations. All budgets (at national, regional, and local level) should be published online in a visually straightforward manner that highlights how the budget breaks down in detail and how expenditure trends develop over time. Citizens could then much easier inform themselves on the way their money is spent, and check on public authorities if irregularities appear. In addition, the top 30 or so public procurement projects (in terms of total costs) and winning companies for each city, region and at national level should be published in easily accessible format online. There are many more opportunities that e-government and the growing open data movement could bring, and citizens would become much better equipped to understand what their public authorities are doing. Exciting initiatives like the Open Government Data Camp that took place this year in Warsaw and local websites like Berlin Open Data bear testimony to the great potential of better transparency measures.

 

Eventually, trust will increase only if European governments stick to their tasks. In my view, the only way to get citizens back in is to credibly show that tax justice and transparency matter. After all, both are essential elements of democracy.

 

Andre Wilkens: Europe’s failure, and how to avoid it

Written by Andre Wilkens | October 19, 2011 | 0 Comments | Theme: Andre Wilkens, Conflict in Europe, Europe as a political economy, Europe as a social space, Europe in crisis, European identity, Global Europe

The European Union’s combination of crises – of finance, politics, and identity – makes the once unthinkable a real prospect: Europe is not “too big to fail”. What then should concerned Europeans do to ensure their continent’s survival and progress? Andre Wilkens proposes five foundations for action.

Europe is at a tipping-point. Amid accumulating financial and political problems in the European Union, the choice is increasingly clear: either the markets will force a massive surge of integration, or things will shift in the opposite direction towards gradual disintegration.

Whatever the outcome, the lack of citizens’ participation has become a systemic risk which puts in jeopardy even any process towards further integration. This makes it vital that concerned European citizens put pressure on their governments and elites – for this pressure can be precisely what Europe’s rulers need to find a sustainable way out of the crisis.

Europe’s current crisis is one of identity as well as of politics and economics. This started in 2005, when a majority of voters in France and the Netherlands voted in referendums against the draft European Union constitution. This was a clear signal that said: Europe has become distant, we don’t understand it anymore.

The answer of the political elites was to press on with what became the technocratic Lisbon treaty, which made improvements in regulatory processes but neglected the important question of economic and financial governance. In the area of foreign policy, the creation of two new EU executive posts (to be occupied by colourless technocrats who would remain unknown to most people) lost the opportunity for an infusion of Euro-enthusiasm.

On the global stage, the EU in the years since the two referendums has increasingly put itself in the position of an onlooker (most evidently at the Copenhagen climate-change summit in December 2009, and during the Arab spring of 2010-11). Within the EU, border-checks were temporarily reintroduced for fear of young migrants coming from the south, a rollback of one of the union’s most tangible achievements.

The financial crisis of 2008 hit the European Union harder than was expected at first. It revealed that European monetary union (EMU) had not been properly thought through to its logical conclusion. The euro, instead of being a factor for deeper integration, has become a systemic danger for the entire European Union. The union has for two whole years been dictated by events rather than shaping them. Its policymakers are reactive, short-term and defensive: they take decisions only when the choice left is between bad and worse – and even then too late.

Even a mere decade ago, Europe was full of self-confidence, seriously believing that the 21st century would belong to the European dream. Now, Europe is a problem – and not just for itself. The notion that Europe is not too big to fail was until recently inconceivable. Now it is all too thinkable.

Europe’s five challenges

There are a number of reasons to fear that the European dream will indeed fail altogether, and outright disintegration follow. The as yet unresolved euro crisis is only the latest. If this fate is to be avoided, five challenges that reach beyond the present moment must be addressed.

Europe must restore the primacy of ends over means

Europe has for two years and even more been ruled more or less openly by the markets. The latter have pitilessly revealed the Euro’s design errors, and forced politicians to make long overdue economic and political decisions; in this sense, the markets may currently be the most active Europeans.

But Europe was not designed to be an economic balance-sheet. Europe was built on historical experience, for political reasons and as a result of political will. Its economic integration was the primary means to achieve political ends: peace, stability and prosperity in the continent. The method of its pioneer, Jean Monnet, was to build Europe top-down: via institution-building, creating closer economic links, and taking incremental steps. A coherent political vision was the driving-force of the development. Now, all this seems to have been turned on its head: Europe is determined by means not goals, the markets drive politics, and the politicians always lag behind.

The paradox is that this reality has produced results that in 2009-10 would have been considered unrealistic. If Angela Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy had at that time announced proposals on European economic governance they are now prepared to contemplate, they would have been celebrated as visionaries in the footsteps of Jean Monnet, Jacques Delors, and Helmut Kohl. Now, their reactive position only emphasises their weakness and fuels both markets’ and citizens’ lack of confidence in them and their fellow leaders.

The markets are unpredictable Europeans. They cannot be relied on. But Europe can overcome its current crisis by returning to the founding aims of the European Union and using them actively to shape policy. For in these turbulent times especially, the original European vision – social stability and economic prosperity in Europe, and the encouragement of peace across the continent – is still relevant and large enough.

Europe must sustain prosperity

The European dream is built on prosperity and growth, its promise that every European citizen will become better off. This was also a central element of the various rounds of enlargement. Even if this is harder to admit, the European community of values was only a secondary reason for most aspirant EU members’ wish to join.

The promise of “prosperity through Europe” worked well for a long time. The financial and debt crisis has, however, undermined it. The particular reasons for the crises in Greece, Portugal, Spain, Ireland and Italy may differ; but Europe is both involved in each one and unable (at least in the short term) to halt the decline of living-standards in these (and other) EU member-states.

This problem highlights the fact that in any case, the present growth-oriented lifestyle needs to be fundamentally reviewed. For this lifestyle is financed on credit – both in monetary terms, and with regard to natural resources – from the next generation and from other parts of the world. Even with better economic management, Europe will not be able to keep the promise of linear growth.

Without prosperity, Europe will not achieve legitimacy from its citizens. A host of questions then arise. What is prosperity in the 21st century, and how can it be shared equitably; what does it actually mean always to be “better off”; and is it possible even to maintain existing levels of prosperity in the face of global competition? These are also questions to which Europe urgently needs to find answers. To do so would be to update and implement the original vision of Europe.

The delivery of prosperity and growth in the 21st century is a great opportunity as well as a system-critical challenge for Europe. In meeting it Europe can renew its visionary role, both out of self-interest and as a global model.

Europe must become more nimble

Europe has up to now been a slow and heavy train that becomes ever longer and more cumbersome as it passes through predictable terrain. If the latter got a bit hilly at times, there was plenty of time to change gear. Now the terrain is getting mountainous, the weather is changing all the time, and the environment is unpredictable. Europe responds by changing gear more quickly and doing its best to maintain speed. It is difficult enough for a heavy train to perform like a lightweight one – even more when fast new trains are appearing on the horizon.

In the last ten years the pace of life has accelerated dramatically as a result of globalisation, new information technologies, and a hyper-creative financial industry. All this has taken place in the context of deepening climate change and resource depletion that obliges Europe (like other international and national agencies) to adapt and be flexible and fast in taking important political and economic decisions.

This is hard for a Europe whose decision-making processes were devised for slower, more predictable times. The current European model was built for a different era, and needs a retrofit. Eurobonds and European economic harmonisation could buy time in the medium term; but Europe needs anyway to become faster, and this can only be achieved by more shared sovereignty. The European train needs more than decorative changes – it needs a stronger central engine, greater coordination, and a speedier transmission-belt to make it fit for the new pace of global life.

Europe must defend its model

The epic year of 1989 was not after all the end of history and the ultimate victory of the west, but rather the beginning of a new multipolar era which has put the position of Europe too into perspective.

Europe’s attempt to respond to the post-1989 changes included the understanding that Europe could play a meaningful global role only if it spoke with a united voice. The establishment under the Lisbon treaty of a European diplomatic corps with a European foreign minister (or rather “High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy”) flowed from this recognition.

A notion that was cleverly conceived in abstract and technical terms has until now had no practical impact. The incumbent, Catherine Ashton and her team are not delivering on the promise, and the wider sense that Europe’s role in the world is declining is almost palpable. Again, the Copenhagen summit (over an issue, climate change, which European citizens pioneered) and the sovereign-debt crisis are the most vivid examples.

Yet it is worth recalling here that the European Union model has itself been a means of solving conflicts and turning problems into opportunities. This model has won many admirers – and should continue to do so. If it were to fall apart, the development of other initiatives of shared governance (such as the African Union) will also be set back. The world needs more such initiatives, not less.

It would be of vital benefit, then, if Europe in its role as a global actor could put its house in order and find ways to improve it. The world needs the European model to be successful. This is not a call for European self-obsession – far less isolationism. On the contrary: Europe can play its important global role credibly and with self-confidence only if it has sorted out its own economic and governance problems.

After that, what resources Europe still has should be used to focus on two or three main global issues on which it can really speak with one voice. At the very top of that list should be the fight against dangerous climate change. Europe set the agenda here and continues to be the frontrunner over implementation; and the issue is closely linked to its economic interests in the context of international competition. Moreover, Europe’s global commitment on climate change is a principle which European citizens – both domestically and in foreign policy – can support and advocate.

Europeans must lobby from below

Europe is dominated by national interests. That is logical in a system where the sole source of direct political legitimacy is via national and regional elections. The elections to the European parliament are proxy votes on national policy whose outcome is not reflected in a European political executive or the composition of the European commission. There is little surprise then that politicians who rely on a popular mandate continue to think mainly in national terms.

In addition, ever fewer politicians have a “European” history of their own. Their personal lives unfold against a European backdrop, but the nation-state is closer to their hearts and strengthening Europe has not been their principal political aim. This is less anti-Europeanism than rational politics. Angela Merkel is a good example here.

The European Union’s executive posts are occupied by compliant technocrats – administrators not shapers of policy. As a result, the foreign-policy executive trio in Brussels (Herman van Rompuy, president of the European council, and José Manuel Barroso, president of the European commission, as well as Catherine Ashton) plays only a very minor part in the present crisis. Europe is more or less directly governed from the national capitals – and national capitals make national European politics.

The national European elites are becoming less and less able to put across a vision of and for Europe. The Brussels institutions cannot compensate for this absence. Since the heyday of Jacques Delors, these institutions have been reduced to the status of an apolitical bureaucracy. This is reflected in the very language of Europe: technical, theoretical, complicated and boring. The various national political discourses are much closer to the people.

Yet the financial crisis shows that politicians can react to pressure – from the markets, and from Eurosceptic and populist movements in Finland, the Netherlands and Britain. After all, politicians are appointed and employed by citizens and should respond to their pressure. But where, then, is the political pressure of those who see the future in more Europe? For Europe’s future cannot be left to national elites, Eurosceptic lobbies and international financial markets. It needs an effective lobby from below that is capable of demanding a proactive European policy.

What next?

European visionaries built the European Union step-by-step as an elite project after the second world war. This is a creative achievement of which Europeans can justly be proud. But this method has reached its limits. To continue in the same way could prevent Europe’s development over the next decades and even destroy what has been achieved.

The incoherent crisis-management of Europe’s current leaderships has shown that passivity, and leaving Europe to “them”, does not work. The European dream can continue only if it is supported by a broad grassroots movement capable of helping to shape it. In short, there must be pressure from below.

The European model is as relevant today as it was in 1945. But in order to survive in the 21st century it has to be refreshed and modernised, both in substance and communication. What is at stake is nothing less than the reinvention of Europe to make it able to continue to guarantee prosperity, stability and peace. This offers a large, compelling vision for Europe’s domestic and foreign policy.

The groups that have benefited most from European integration, and are now seeing for the first time that European integration is not irreversible, must be given a political voice. Armchair Europeans will have to become engaged Europeans; a civil lobby, which uses national and European elections to make political decision-makers listen and respond must be mobilised.

This will not be easy in a context where turnout in European-parliament elections has been declining since the first direct election in 1979 (the average turnout in 2009 was 43%). This trend will have to be reversed in 2014: an even further retreat from engagement by European voters, when anti-European groups are getting stronger and better organised, would be very damaging.

Thus the immediate goal of a citizens’ movement would be to make the elections to the European parliament in 2014 a matter of real choice of political direction. After all, there are more than enough European issues to be contested, politically and emotionally. Among them:

* How can Europe safeguard prosperity and stability in the future?

* How can the power of the financial markets be restrained?

* What should a social policy of redistribution look like?

* How can opportunities for young people be created, and their potential released?

* What should be the shape of policy in key areas – industrial policy in the age of globalisation, sustainable-energy policy to contain climate change and provide work, education policy to ensure qualified citizens and international competitiveness?

The European parliament elections of 2014 must indeed be European instead of national “proxy-elections”, in part by pressing to use them to decide the composition of the European commission.

There are many opportunities for a new movement that is independent, open, political and passionate. The current wave of occupations in many cities worldwide bring some of them to life. Social media and older forms of political communication and campaigning, if they are used creatively, can combine to make a real difference. Europe must be visible online and offline with a civil lobby of its own. Only in this way will a sustainable way out of the European identity crisis be found. It is time for concerned Europeans to act.