Option number 1 is where we started and indeed is a prolongation of the current paradigm. Its working title can be  Transformative Power of Europe Reloaded. In current policy jargon, this is actually the status quo option – presuming that things can stay the same with some fixing and that Europe just needs a little more time to grow into its bones. Just get past this crisis, reassure citizens, put some straightjacket on debtor countries and come up with a way to finance it all, and the convergence effect will start again, countries will catch up, reform and modernize, no need to change the fundamentals. Most speakers, and all politicians, notably President Barroso, spoke from within this paradigm in different variants.

Option number 2 is the step back from euro, considering it the main cause of the problems, because it exposed Europe’s weakest economies and finally the whole Eurozone. Its working title can be Abandon the Bridge Too Far –orderly, please (retirement, not a rout). Fritz Scharf made the clear argument that setting the interest rate of the “one size fits all” European level exposed Europe’s less developed economies. Their fiscal deficits were not their main problem, and their ability to reform had been proven prior to joining the euro: they simply are the victims of unfavorable real interest rates. Not acknowledging that the euro is at the root cause of this will only bring further problems, this argument runs. As Mario Monti suggested, alternatives to the monetary union – some form of tax harmonization, for instance- do exist, and might have less adverse effects.

Option number 3 is a step further by a coalition of the most capable and the willing (not one and the same, as it turns out) and its running title can be Many Europes in One. President Barroso alluded to it in his State of Europe speech when boldly claiming that monetary integration has to be deepened and not abandoned. A departure point was already given by Jean-Claude Piris when suggesting that a supplementary treaty of top of this one could be signed by some EU members. But this option is fraught with unintended consequences. Two groups of countries which both believe they are the most capable would result if this option is chosen, according to Monti, a core European group which would move to further monetary integration, and a group of high economic competitiveness remaining outside the euro (Sweden, Denmark, Britain, some new member countries). What is left is a third group, formed by ‘failed’ Euro members, and a residual fourth by the smallest and weakest.

Now the risk and cost analysis of each version is the next step (and shall not be attempted here). Just briefly, the first one we try already, and it’s not working very well. After all, did not Italy and Greece deliberately join the euro hoping this would constrain their transformation? And has not this ambition ended up in their current problems? The second one needs more study: at first glance George Soros said that eggs cannot be unscrambled. The third option would create divisions within Europe and it’s not clear if indeed competitiveness of the Euro core group would outmatch that of the top group outside the euro. Presently, with the notable exception of Germany, it is the other way around. But leaving the euro aside, Europe already works as ‘coalitions of willing’ and should do even more so in issues of climate change and defense, argued the keynote speakers, Minister Norbert Röttgen, and Rt Hon Jim Murphy MP, Shadow Secretary of State for Defence.

Any more alternatives, anyone?

In fact, participants discussed European democracy, the European social space and the European foreign policy. The dominant topic, however, was the euro-crisis. As Alina Mungiu-Pippidi from Hertie School has pointed out, three alternative ways to handle the crisis became apparent. The first one she labeled “Transformative Power of Europe reloaded”. It is basically a more-of-the-same-strategy, whose proponents suggest that after the crisis, European countries, cultures and economies will re-converge towards a more united Europe. The second option, called by her “Abandon the Bridge Too Far”, presumes that not all European countries can really cope with a common currency. A break-up of the euro would be the consequence. In that case, alternatives have to be found to make possible a smooth transition and the continuing existence of a European project – though it won’t be the same as today’s project. The third way would be a further differentiation of the integration process.

None of these three options found consensus, of course. Experts and policy-makers alike are unsure how the crisis will evolve and what measures are adequate to address it. All options would have consequences for citizens, but which exactly remains somewhat obscure.

Are these options new? Did the Dahrendorf Symposium succeed in “Changing the Debate on Europe”? No. All of them were discussed in newspapers and think tanks for some time now. But the Dahrendorf Symposium was nevertheless an opportunity to meet and discuss the current crisis, as it brought together so many participants, including ministers, ex- and incoming-Prime Ministers, and Parliamentarians from different countries.

What was missing in the debate? As the euro-crisis consumes much of the time, other issues never made it on the table. Discussions of resource-consumption and environment are victims of the euro-crisis, the situation of migrants and minorities was discussed only at the margins and possible negative consequences of the currency-crisis for democracy in Europe are acknowledged while alternatives were unfortunately not suggested.

Public participation has always been a weak point in European integration. To allow for more participation would mean a real major shift in the debate on Europe. But as long as discussions about the right way forward in Europe are seen as essentially negative, as long as publics in European states don’t take notice of arguments in other countries and don’t engage in public discussions with them, as long as the media are seeing developments in Europe often enough as “foreign” news, even if these developments affect very directly welfare and well-being of the citizens, as long as the media entrench themselves behind barriers of national borderlines, such a change of debate still seems to be a kind of utopia. Many more forums, and not only, are still needed to turn this so close utopia to reality.

Fiscal federalism reflects civil service arrogance and elite snobbery, because it assumes—possibly unwittingly—that those who govern know what is good for their people and hence the people’s expressed preferences can be ignored, nor need one make major efforts to seek to change these preferences to bring them in line with the policies considered prudent. This approach ignores that one cannot run roughshod over all the people all the time. To impose fiscal federalism under these conditions will lead only to more alienation. And while one cannot predict how this alienation will express itself, one can foresee that it is going to be mightily disruptive.

One may argue that the new fiscal policies could be subjected to review and approval by the European Parliament, the European Council, or some other representative body and hence would reflect the people’s consensus. These bodies, though, have well known structural problems: Many of the potential bodies include non-Euro-Zone nations, they often reflect an aggregation of national interests but not EU-wide or Euro-Zone-wide needs, and they are not considered true representatives by many millions of Europeans. Moreover, from a sociological viewpoint, their defect runs deeper; it concerns not a democratic deficit but a community deficit. This is the case because, when a group of nations follow a common fiscal policy, this means that some will have to make sacrifices for others. Thus, if the economies of some nations are overheating, and the shared fiscal policy calls for cutting government expenditures and raising revenue—those nations whose economies were in low gear to begin with will sputter. If higher deficits are tolerated, those nations with strong credit ratings will suffer disproportionally, and so on and on.

Members of communities are willing to make such sacrifices for each other and the common good. This is the case because communities entail strong bonds of affinity, a core of shared values, and a culture of mutual commitment. Hence people are willing to make major sacrifices for members of their extended family, tribes, ethnic or racial groups, and the nation—sacrifices they are extremely reluctant to make for non-members. Thus, Northern Italians have long made major economic sacrifices for Sicily (and more generally the South) because the Northerners pay more taxes and get fewer benefits from the state. Although every once in a while some observer will complain about the considerable transfer payment involved and non-serious threats of secession are made, Northern Italians continue to indulge the Southerners because they are all members of their community; they are fellow Italians. In contrast, when Germans, French, Finns, or Brits are called upon to bail out the weaker Euro-Zone nations, there are sharp limits to the sacrifices they are willing to make.

An even more telling example is the willingness to make the ultimate sacrifice. Members of communities are willing to die for their family, ethnic or racial communities, and, most assuredly, their nation—but nobody is willing to risk even a limb for the EU or the Euro-Zone. It follows that either the Euro-Zone will build up a supranational community, one that will have some of the attributes nations currently have—or there will be limits to the sacrifices members are willing to make for each other, sacrifices that fiscal policy requires.

One may say that when people agreed to join the Euro-Zone, they agreed, at least implicitly, to make such sacrifices for one another. However, it seems that this was not understood by those who voted in favor of joining the Euro-Zone. They were persuaded to join on the grounds that a common currency would benefit all those who joined—somewhat like how free trade advocates hold that all who participate in a reduction of barriers to the flow of trade would benefit. There is no evidence that most people were told of, let alone understood and consented to, the need to make major sacrifices for other nations in the zone.

If the preceding analysis is valid, the nations of the Euro-Zone can either move to a much higher level of integration that includes fiscal federalism as well as major community building drives, aiming to bestow on the zone some attributes now monopolized by national communities—or they will have to scale back their conjoined activities, especially the common currency. They cannot stand between two steps.

Mr. Hoyer, who is a possible candidate for the President of the European Investment Bank, what might explain the shift, was answering calls from Italy’s former Prime Minister Giuliano Amato. Both were attending a roundtable on “Changing the debate on Europe” at the Dahrendorf Symposium, held at the Berlin-Brandenburgische Akademie der Wissenschaften in Berlin last week. Mr. Amato said: “Let us issue Eurobonds for common projects. Let us give our citizens the feeling of getting more from Europe, nor less! Otherwise: Where should growth come from?”

Yet on what kind of projects the new debts should be spent for, both remained silent. In fact, it seemed, Mr. Amato and Mr. Hoyer intended primarily to make people feel better about the European Union. “We have to make the EU appealing, not a source of constraints”, Mr. Amato said. Citing concerns in Italy and Greece, he added: “Maybe some citizens say: ‘Well, without the pressure from Germany, we would get through our problems much better.’”

Whether or not intended, new, and probably expensive projects, seem to be seen as a possible way out of current euro-skepticism.  “When it became nasty, language was not very peaceful anymore”, Mr. Hoyer reminded the audience. The usual legitimization of the EU might not be enough anymore, he fears. “We do need a new narrative on Europe”, Mr. Hoyer said. “We shouldn’t forget the old ones, but we should give people also a new one.”

If project bonds will mark a shift towards higher acceptance of the EU by the public or towards calmer markets remains difficult to judge in advance. To calm markets, which are in panic about a possible default of Greece, that could possibly then lead to further defaults, project bonds seem to be too small, no matter what size they are going to have exactly. To change attitudes towards Europe, project bonds might simply be the wrong answer, as they wouldn’t mean less austerity on a national level and, especially, painful but necessary reforms, to get rid of, for example, the traditional two-tier labor-markets that privilege those who already have got jobs, especially in the state-sector, and the elderly at the expense of those who have not yet found a permanent job and have to live with precarious part-time employments.

Maybe the problems could at least partially be solved by a different, more respectful way of communication. Wolfgang Ischinger, ex-ambassador and Chairman of the Munich Security Conference, and participant at the roundtable, called for more intervention by Europeans into each other’s internal affairs, but also for more emotion. “I believe we are not courageous enough. We have to intervene in each other’s internal affairs more often than we do, but not only negatively”, he said. “I am waiting for the moment when Merkel and Sarkozy will travel to Greece and tell the Greeks that we also love them. Emotional elements matter in Europe, and we need to tell each other that we love each other”.

At times, it seems, politics can be surprisingly romantic. As in every love affair, more romanticism would also mean less independency, though. Are Europeans ready to fall in love with each other with these strings attached?

Of course there is some kind of a European Foreign policy. In fact, it is even visible in media coverage, Thomas Risse from Freie Universität Berlin pointed out. And Europe has some influence. Strangely enough, this influence is stronger often in those areas, in which its influence is not intentionally implemented. International Courts, for example, model the European Court of Justice, and other regional organizations study the EU very closely to copy elements they like.

Later that day, Wolfgang Ischinger, German ex-ambassador and now Chairman of the Munich Security Conference, cited Donald Rumsfeld, the former US Secretary of Defense: “If you can’t solve the problem – enlarge it, put it in a wider context.” That idea might be useful for the discussion on European Foreign Policy as well. Even if chances remain low to negotiate some effective international agreement, say, on climate change, chances might be higher if Europeans negotiate together then if they were to negotiate alone. The same goes for most other policies.

Yet even when it comes to the common foreign policy, expectations might easily fly high, and, indeed, too high. A common European foreign policy might be more effective then 27 national foreign policies. However, other international actors still have to be persuaded. So it might be fairer not to judge European foreign policy in the simple terms of success or failure and more in respect to what results probably might have come out of a given situation without a common policy (in the making). Additionally, National states as well often implement non-coherent foreign policies (in conflict with their trade- or development policies, for example), change them over time, contest them domestically, and react too slowly to new circumstances (have a look at the Arab Spring). That said, EU-foreign policy might still benefit from a more coherent strategy, less quarrels and quicker decision-making. But it doesn’t look as catastrophic as it seems on first glance.

And indeed, Mrs. Kocze gave some depressing figures: More than 90 percent of Hungary’s Roma are unemployed. Very low numbers of Roma go to high school. A mere 0.2 percent of Roma attend university, she said. “We are witnessing the gradual empowerment of the extreme right in Hungary, the Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden”, Mrs. Kocze added. But not only on the political right has the climate got chilly: “Italian authorities expelled European (Roma) citizens. And this decision was not taken by far-right politicians, but by the center-left government led by Romano Prodi”, she bemoaned.

Her conclusion was obvious: “The European project is under threat: From the left, from the far right”, and “from neoliberalism”.

Missing in this discussion were possible solutions to address the issue. Instead, participants largely stopped at concentrating on the problem. However, it became clear again, that missing information is a key. European media coverage on transnational social problems is far too superficial and random. When did you hear the last time about Roma exclusion in the (German) press? What do you know about Roma living in Berlin? When did you read the last interview with migrants coming to live here disclosing their motivations? Media and public, it seems, first have to recognize migrants and minorities, before stereotypes can pass to give way to more profound knowledge.

Chalmers underlined that Dahrendorf would have enjoyed especially the uncomfortable questions raised by the conference.

Anheier announced that the LSE, the Hertie School and the Sciences Po would set up a series of workshops to test some of the main visionary ideas raised during the symposium and keep the momentum alive. He explicitly mentioned the vision of a more democratic Europe proposed by the German federal Minister Norbert Röttgen in his keynote speech.

Lorentz concluded that the British-German partnership and the whole Dahrendorf symposium have successfully paid tribute to Lord Dahrendorf.

Thank you for having followed the blog!

Sir Colin Budd agrees. The former UK ambassador believes in the high potential of EU foreign policy in terms of actual policy making but also as a motivation for the Europeans to work together.

State of affairs

Today the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy is as elaborated as never before: The EU has a diplomatic service, the External Action Service (EEAS) headed by Catherine Ashton. The EU has military forces, the “EU battle groups”. The EU runs several operations all over the world, for example in Kosovo or at the coast of Somalia. And the EU has institutions to wield control, such as the Political and Security Committee. However, most foreign policy is still conducted intergovernmentally, that is, by the nation states.

Prospects

During the panel debate “global Europe” and those of the first day all participants stressed that the EU has indeed a potential to further its efforts in this field. There are many examples for this: the fight against the climate change, the defence of human rights, crisis response, cooperation in diplomacy or defence.

Depending on the speaker the argument for further foreign policy cooperation was based on international power play, like the upraise of China or balancing the US, or rather cosmopolitan reasons, to “save the world.” In either way, the reason d’être for closer European foreign policy seems undisputed.

Europe in a globalised World – the new narrative?

The facts are clear but is the prospect of Europe in a globalised world reason enough for Europeans to actually demand deeper integration? In my eyes solely rational arguments are not enough. Even though the advantages of integration are more clear when you look at Europe from a global perspective, people may be reluctant to vote for this undertaking. Why is this?

First of all, people have problems so adopt to the rapid changes of the 21st century. Instead of accepting the changes they prefer to keep the situation they have been used to. As Wolfgang Ischinger puts it: “The people fell in a love affair with the status quo.” Second, life is not only rational – feeling plays an important role as well: “We all know the advantages of the EU by heart, Cem Özdemir, a German politician, said, “but the people do not feel them. They are too unfairly allocated.” Finally, Europeans are afraid to lose control over what is happening.

How to solve these problems? First, Politicians need to communicate the necessities of EU integration better. Yes, they need to take over responsibility and actually lead. Second, People have to feel the advantages of European integration and they need to feel more European as well. Thus, give Europe a social dimension or advance exchange programmes like Erasmus to include already school students. Finally, make sure democratic control is given on all levels. If foreign policy becomes Europeanised, the European Parliament needs to control it – and not the executive of the Member States.

If Europe succeeds in this we would not only ensure Europe’s influence on world stage but also find a new narrative for Europe. Can we change the debate on Europe to achieve this?

Part of the first pillar – the Eurozone – is now at stake as a result of the financial crisis and years of negligence of mutual control within the European Union itself. Luckily so far the other aspect of the institutional integration in Europe is not being questioned. But we do not know what is yet to come. Several months ago we wouldn’t believe in many of ideas that are now in the mainstream.

Unfortunately, the other element of the European construct – the European consciousness – unnoticeably jumped out of the window the moment crisis knocked at the door. Within days we observed most of the European political elites forgetting about their Europeanness. A vision of a financial crisis possibly messing with the unstable monetary union caused the politicians to step back into their comfort zone of the national arena. Instead of seeing acts suited for the times, as the times of trouble require people of a bigger format and actions of a bigger vision and a higher meaning, we ended up with leaders not courageous enough to be true statesmen of the united Europe.

The sad truth is that no one of them is really interested in acting as European. Each and every EU Member State entrenched in their national rhetoric.  Everyone is happy to have same one to complain about, everybody has a scapegoat. The Germans and French has the Greek and Italian to blame for living beyond their means, the Greeks and Italian political elites has the Germans and French to act as the bad guy that forces the painful cuts and reforms. The grey middle zone – countries not big enough or not financially weak enough to be spotted – use their chance not to be in the center of the events. No one wants to jump in as the new ‘problem’ but also no one is interested in sharing the responsibility of rescuing and bailing out the unfortunate ones.  But there is no European thinking behind it.

We do not think as Europeans, we think as Germans, Greek, Italians, Poles and so on. Somewhere on the way we lost our ability to act together. It is very convenient for state political elites, because it makes the internal discourse easier – you get the external power that forces you to do things you would otherwise not have done, you have a dog to blame all the non popular decision on.

But on a long term it is detrimental for both the European integration as well as the condition of the economy. Due to the crisis the European project is already pretty fragile, as even a dissolution entered the mainstream debate as a possible solution. If we do not act as a collective, if we do not have and according to a sense of belonging together (or, so as to quote the favorite German expression of Sylvie Goulard, the ‘Wir-Gefühl’). On the other hand, if the markets snd international financial institutions saw a solidary, unanimous Europe not afraid of facing problems and oriented on finding solutions, the search for the latter would be possible in a less chaotic and unpredictable environment.

Maybe it is time for us to have the courage of standing up as Europeans. Europeans caring for and taking care of their co-citizens. Europeans living up to their values.

“Emotional elemtents are important, we have to tell each other that we love each other.”